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Introduction
Can a negative shock to sovereign ratings invoke a vicious cycle of increasing government bond yields and further downgrades that might ultimately push a country into default? In particular, the narratives of public and political discussions, supported by some widely cited papers such as Ferri, Liu & Stiglitz (1999) , suggest this possibility. In this paper, we propose a semiparametric bivariate framework to analyze the interaction between sovereign ratings and government bond yields to assess whether this narrative is empirically plausible.
Credit rating agencies especially the so called Big Three: Moody's, Standard and Poor's (S&P) and Fitch IBCA took heavy blame for the recent nancial crisis and subsequent (and partly still ongoing) great recession. When a crisis happens, it is almost tautological to note that rating agencies failed to predict it. After all, if rating agencies had foreseen that specic assets were highly risky, whether they are senior tranches of asset-backed securities, corporate bonds or sovereign bonds, then over-investment in these specic asset classes would probably have been avoided. However, regarding government bonds in particular, which are the main interest of this paper, the most frequently voiced concern is not the rating agencies' failure to predict crises, but the possibility that unfavorable rating changes cause capital ight, driving the risk premium up and thereby causing further problems that are sanctioned with another rating downgrade. When S&P downgraded the French rating from triple to double A on August 11, 2013, the rst response of the French government (through the minister of nance, Pierre Moscovici) was to criticize the decision.
1 It is obvious why politicians favor the view of a vicious cycle that can befall the best of us. This argument essentially builds on a result that was rst proposed by Ferri et al. (1999) in their widely cited paper on the Asian Flu in the late 1990s. Yet, their result is far from uncontroversial. The original study has been harshly criticized by Mora (2006) and El-Shagi (2010) . Similarly, other recent papers that address the same question in the context of the European debt crisis reach very dierent conclusions. While Baum, Karpava, Schäfer & Stephan (2014) also nd evidence of a substantial impact of ratings on capital allocation, De Vries & De Haan (2014) focus on the nding that the increased volatility following a rating downgrade was only temporary.
The seeming contradiction between the latter two contributions highlights a key omission in the literature that the present paper aims to ll. Much of the literature criticizing rating agencies focuses on their short-term impact or aims to show that there is some arbitrariness to ratings (e.g Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2012) . Nevertheless, as noted by El-Shagi & von Schweinitz (2015) , neither of those eects provides sucient empirical evidence of a vicious cycle between ratings and the risk premium that can push a country from a good to a bad equilibrium. Even if a rating downgrade does increase the interest rate, the new high interest is merely paid on new and rolled over debt. That is, if the average maturity is not extremely short (which usually occurs only in countries that have low ratings to begin with), the increase of the interest rate has to be sustained for a considerable length of time to actually increase the scal burden.
2 To demonstrate the existence of a vicious cycle that inevitably leads to default unless the country is 1 See, for example, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-08/france-credit-rating-cut-toaa-by-s-p-on-weak-growth-prospects. 2 Rating downgrades can have a negative impact on government nances beyond their direct eects. Due to the so-called sovereign ceiling (an implicit rule whereby companies only rarely obtain a better rating than their home country), government downgrades will negatively aect ratings of companies, increasing interest payments and worsening the economic outlook (Durbin & Ng 2005) . aected by subsequent positive shocks, it is necessary to prove the existence of explosive behavior in ratings and yields under particular conditions (such as a threshold for risk beyond which behavior becomes explosive). A weaker form of a vicious cycle which is still strong enough to cause default, at least hypothetically is the combination of the strong self-reinforcing behavior of rating downgrades, combined with high persistence in rating levels in the absence of shocks and/or a lesser degree of self-reinforcing behavior for rating upgrades. Under those conditions, a negative rating shock might multiply before the system stabilizes (for a while) at a far lower rating, thus increasing interest rates and the scal burden. While technically not a second equilibrium, this kind of selfreinforcement with transitory stabilization and slow recovery would qualify as a vicious cycle in the sense used by the major critics of rating agencies.
In our paper, we augment a recently suggested approach by El-Shagi & von Schweinitz (2015) , who simultaneously model long-run relationship and short-run dynamics in a model that explicitly allows for multiple equilibria. That is, El-Shagi & von Schweinitz avoid the validity problems associated with estimated long-or short-run dependencies that exist when only one of the two horizons is explicitly modeled. While the original paper pays little attention to the short-run dynamics, mostly modeling them to allow robust inference about the long-run relationship, the current paper focuses on the joint dynamics of government ratings and sovereign bond yields.
Those dynamic aspects have been widely ignored in the previous empirical analysis of sovereign ratings. While there is a huge body of literature on the immediate impact of ratings, the dynamic part of the analysis usually takes the form of a simple event study.
Rare exceptions (such as De Santis (2012)) derive impulse response functions based on VAR models, that treat ratings as a continuous variable. Contrary to a standard VAR approach, we are able to account for the ordinal nature of ratings, include nonlinearities and asymmetries. Yet, this comes at a cost. The model we estimate is computationally demanding even in the bivariate form presented in this paper. Thus, we cannot account for the role of other macroeconomic variables. Since the interest rates react fairly quickly, and institutional variables are well covered by xed eects, we do however believe that the benets of our approach outweigh the losses.
We augment the dynamic part of the model of El-Shagi & von Schweinitz substantially, most importantly by allowing for asymmetric eects of both rating and yield changes. This modication allows for the type of vicious cycle that is driven by short-run dynamics rather than by convergence to a bad equilibrium. We conrm their nding that there is strong evidence of a single good equilibrium. At no point is the typical risk premium associated with a rating sucient to justify further rating downgrades. Yet, we nd that downgrades can come at a substantial cost. Over the short run, rating changes tend to mildly reinforce themselves, slightly increasing the risk of further downgrades.
Additionally, we do observe sharply increasing risk premia when ratings fall below the B+ level. Due to the high persistence of ratings, those interest premia can last many years, thus generating substantial macroeconomic costs without being vicious cycles.
Yet, simulation studies based on downgrade episodes from the past decades show that unfavorable developments that have occasionally been observed after initial downgrades cannot be explained through the common joint dynamics of ratings and yields. They are thus most likely driven by an actual change in the fundamentals (or a correction in their assessment).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briey review the previous empirical ndings, provide some introductory stylized facts on the dynamics of ratings and yields and discuss some of the associated measurement problems. In Section 3, we explain our econometric model and the methods employed. Section 4 presents our results on the long-and short-run relation between ratings and yields, including the scenario simulations reproducing previous downgrade episodes using our model. Section 5 concludes.
Previous evidence and stylized facts
In particular, the critics of rating agencies believe them to hold as Ferri et al. (1999) puts it a tremendous power. They claim that the major rating agencies, Moody's, S&P and Fitch frequently dubbed the Big Three strongly shape the behavior of international investors, despite their nding that they add only limited information.
There is a long and extensive literature that aims to identify the factors that inuence sovereign credit rating decisions. In general, debt sustainability measures, the degree of economic development and the default history (Cantor & Packer 1996 , Gärtner, Griesbach & Jung 2011 as well as political stability and governance indicators (Mellios & Paget-Blanc 2006) are found to be important. One of the most general results regarding ratings is that agencies react to past fundamentals rather than successfully predict future shocks (Cantor & Packer 1996 , Reisen & von Maltzan 1999 . However, while providing only little new information in normal times, rating agencies aim to reestablish their reputation after missing an emerging crisis, responding with overly restrictive downgrades (Ferri et al. 1999 , White 2010 . This creates capital ight, increasing the interest rate and thus the scal burden of the government, which is driven even closer to an actual default. In the case of sovereign ratings, this problem is particularly severe because sovereign ratings also serve as the so-called sovereign ceiling, that is, a best-case rating for all but a few companies with headquarters in that country (Durbin & Ng 2005) .
Therefore, capital ight can also aect the private sector, slowing the economy and eroding the tax base. This problem is exacerbated by the reliance of regulators on ratings.
These regulations often indicate that assets with ratings below a certain threshold are not considered as investment but speculation; thus, these assets are strongly restricted or penalized (White 2010) . Of course, this argument of a self-fullling prophecy is controversial, e.g., El-Shagi (2010) notes the inconsistency in simultaneously claiming that rating agencies obviously and systematically err and noting that the majority of investors does not recognize this and follows the rating agencies despite their shortcomings.
Yet, the responsibility of rating agencies for nancial market turbulence is a well-established narrative, particularly in politics. The ongoing debate in the European Union about the need for a large European rating agency is a textbook example of the magnitude of the inuence that is attributed to rating agencies by politicians. The fear of the Big Three all headquartered in the US and UK became so severe that even major politicians in the European Union (such as Rainer Bruederle, the head of the FDP (libertarian) group in the German Bundestag and a former federal minister of economic aairs) became worried that American institutions tried to deliberately exploit their inuence to hurt the Euro (area).
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The original example that fueled the debate about the dangers of rating agencies is the so-called Asian Flu in the late 1990s. Ferri et al. (1999) argue that they played a 3 See for example http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13756954/Bruederle-forderteuropaeische-Ratingagentur.html. signicant role in accelerating the crisis. Their argument is based on the rst downgrades of Thailand (October 1997, from A-to BBB), Malaysia (December 1997, from A+ to A) and Indonesia (December 1997, from BBB to BB+) . Their conclusion is challenged from two directions: Mora (2006) nds ratings to be sticky rather than procyclical. 4 El-Shagi (2010) goes one step further and documents that there were many rating adjustments following these rst downgrades, the last and most signicant of them occurring shortly before the end of the crisis and sometimes even after. That is, there is at least as much evidence that rating agencies merely follow the market rather than triggering or worsening a crisis by downgrading a country.
The second prime example proposed by critics of rating agencies relates to the ongoing European debt crisis. It was argued that the actions of (US-based) agencies unduly increased market pressure on European periphery countries, increasing their government bond yields to unsustainable levels, thus triggering a public debt crisis with severe longrun macroeconomic costs. Arezki, Candelon & Sy (2011) nd that some downgrades in the Euro area, such as the one of Greece from A-to BBB+ by Fitch on December 8, 2009, had systematic spillover eects to other European countries (see also Beirne & Fratzscher 2013) . That is, the downgrading of Greece is found to have increased not only the CDS spreads of government bonds (a measure of credit default risk) in Greece but also in a number of other European countries. The authors claim that these spillovers alone may trigger further nancial instability. However, their results for spillover eects are quite heterogeneous and thus may not be strong enough to support their claim in a more general setting. The ndings of Afonso, Furceri & Gomes (2012) point to a much more balanced view of the question at hand. First, they nd a strong and asymmetric effect of rating changes. They also nd, that these changes are mostly unanticipated one to two months ahead (with evidence of limited bidirectional Granger causality afterwards), concluding that there may be limited evidence of the market power of rating agencies.
However, markets react quickly, which partly refutes the argument that ratings can actually drive a country into default. A similarly balanced position is taken by Gärtner et al. (2011) , who use yearly data and a fundamental estimation of ratings as in Cantor & Packer (1996) to determine non-fundamentally justied aspects of ratings. They argue that these aspects of rating decisions also aect yield spreads. That is, an erroneous (arbitrary) downgrading decision might trigger yield increases, which would open the possibility of further downgrades in the future. This result is partially challenged by the nding of De Vries & De Haan (2014) that credit ratings and yields have recently become disentangled: after the summer of 2012, the yield levels of European periphery countries decreased quickly while ratings stayed at very low levels. The authors attribute this to either unconventional monetary policy or increasing conservativeness among credit rating agencies. However, their econometric model does not include short-run eects and allows for varying eects of dierent rating levels only to a very limited extent. Therefore, the econometric model of De Vries & De Haan may be misspecied, and the slow adjustment of ratings may simply be due to their general stickiness.
After briey introducing our dataset, we will present a few stylized facts regarding the joint dynamics of ratings and yields to motivate our own econometric approach in the following subsections. In particular, we will argue that it is necessary to consider (a) both short-and long-run eects in the model, (b) nonlinearities in the long-run relation, 4 The stickiness of ratings may have two causes: rst, they could be due to shortcomings in information processing; second, to a tendency of rating agencies to avoid rating reversals if default probabilities uctuate near the boundary of two discrete rating classes (Löer 2005) . and (c) asymmetries in the short-run relation.
Measurement and sample selection
Ratings: To maximize data coverage, we use the ratings of foreign currency denominated government bonds as provided by Moody's, S&P and Fitch.
5 Due to higher international demand, foreign currency bonds have often been rated long before the agencies considered domestic currency denominated bonds. Yet, the ratings for dierent bonds issued by the same country are generally highly correlated.
6
The three agencies use grades to assess the probability of a default over the mediumto long-term, where better grades correspond to lower default probabilities. The names of grades dier across agencies. However, this dierence is merely notational (Cantor & Packer 1996) . Therefore, grades can be easily compared and transformed into the ordinal scale given in table 1. Throughout the remainder of this paper, we will use the S&P notation.
As market movements are often found to be strong around rating announcements (which provide new signals), the most important signal is probably provided by the rst agency to adjust its rating. However, there seems to be some evidence for specialization and leadership of the agencies in specic markets (Hill & Fa 2010) , which is why we should include information from all agencies rather than concentrate on a single agency. In addition to accounting for the timeliness of new information, average ratings provide an implicit safeguard against random judgment errors.
Where a rational representation of the rating is required, we use the mean rating of all three agencies (see also De Vries & De Haan 2014). However, for most of our analysis, we aim to maintain the ordinal nature of the ratings, contrary to the majority of the literature considering rating levels. The reason for this is the non-linear relationship between ratings and default probabilities. Our rating class dummies are generated by rounding the mean rating to the next integer and considering the joint rating as belonging to the corresponding rating class dened in Table 1 . It is fairly well documented that the ratings of dierent agencies seldom dier by much, even during times of higher uncertainty when rating agencies adjust their assessments more frequently (Ferri et al. 1999). 7 Therefore, this averaging generally corresponds to the majority rating of the three agencies.
As a robustness check, we also employ the median of the three agencies. However, the dierences in results are marginal.
Yields: We measure the risk premium through the real government bond yield on sovereign bonds with a maturity of 5 to 10 years, denominated in the domestic currency.
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Again, this choice is mostly enforced by data availability and feasibility. While real yields are strongly driven by default risk, they simultaneously capture other factors, such 5 The data are collected from http://countryeconomy.com/ 6 The correlation is 94% for ratings, and 74% of domestic rating changes occur at the same time as foreign rating changes. 7 Empirically, the standard deviation across agencies is 0.77 notches, the mean absolute dierence to the average is 0.5 notches. That is, rating agencies are on average far less than one notch apart. 8 Thus, there exists a currency mismatch between ratings and yields. However, the correlation between domestic and foreign ratings is very high. The results are broadly robust to using domestic instead of foreign ratings or to using the emerging market bond index (EMBI, produced by JP Morgan) in US dollars. Both alternative measures for ratings or yields come at the cost of a signicantly reduced dataset: domestic ratings are only available much later, and the EMBI only covers emerging markets. In default with little prospect for recovery Conversely, yields on domestic currency bonds are widely available for a broad range of countries for extended periods. The 5 to 10 year maturity mirrors the risk horizon of rating agencies. To produce comparable yields for dierent countries, we deate the yields using the year-on-year ination of the previous 12 months. While past ination is not a perfect measure of ination expectations, which would be required to compute expected real returns, ination time series are available for far more countries and periods than survey data or other more direct measures of expectations. Figure 1 shows the distribution of those real yields. In approximately 85% of the periods, yields are positive, and they have a mean and median near 2.5%. This is plausible, as investors would only be willing to accept yields below current ination rates if they can be nearly certain that the latter will decrease in the near future. On average, we expect developing countries to have higher credit risk and ination volatility, both contributing to higher average real yields. However, these expectations are not 9 In a second exception, the nominal yield in Sri Lanka exceeded 450% in July 2010. This value is so unreasonably high that we exclude it from our estimation as an outlier. All other available observations are included in our sample. fullled by the summary statistics in Table 2. 10 Advanced economies have, on average, higher real yields. This counterintuitive result can largely be attributed to Greece. If we exclude it, average yields are comparable between groups, with a much lower standard deviation (i.e., volatility) in advanced economies. 
Stylized Facts
Nonlinearities: As ratings measure default probabilities in a nonlinear way (Löer 2005) , it is not very likely that ratings (or their assigned values) can be used linearly. In the present context, this limitation especially holds when the potential eect of an investment grade threshold and the possibly nonlinear relationship between default probabilities and sovereign yields is taken into account. Therefore, dierent authors used various transformations of ratings when they seek to explain (medium-run) yield movements. 11 Larraín, Reisen & von Maltzan (1997) test both a linear and a logistic transformation of ratings; Ferri et al. (1999) provide evidence for an exponential conversion, which is also used (along with linear and cubic conversions) by (Gärtner & Griesbach 2012) .
Given that there is no agreement on how to transform ratings so that a linear relationship between transformed ratings and yields can be expected, we think that a more exible transformation should be employed. This transformation will be presented in the following section along with our method of addressing the short-and long-run interactions of ratings and yields.
In Figure 2 , it can be seen that the level relation between ratings and yields is basically at for all but the lowest rating classes, even well below the investment grade threshold 10 The classication of countries follows (IMF 1997) . A detailed list of countries with data availability can be found in Table A1 of the appendix. 11 In event studies with windows of only a few days, the nonlinearity of ratings does not play such a large role.Note: The rating scale (notation of S&P) is inverted in this and all following graphs. That is, the x-axis displays increasing ratings (i.e., lower risk) when going from right to left.
between BBB-and BB+. How can this non-relation be reconciled with the anecdotal evidence and the reasonable assumption that (inverted) ratings and yields should be positively correlated, as they are both measuring the same thing? First, ratings are constant for long periods of time during which yields may slowly adjust to new risk levels. Second, real yields are aected by many more factors in addition to sovereign risk. Rather than interpreting the at slope as the absence of a risk premium, it should be interpreted as a risk premium of an order of magnitude that is overshadowed by the general variance of interest rates. Only if risk becomes substantial, does the risk premium begins to quickly increase. This is not purely related to the nonlinearity of risk measurement; it is actually in line with theory, which predicts that risk premia goes to innity when the default probability becomes approaches one.
Persistence: Figure 3 shows the histogram of average ratings. Nearly 60% of our ratings are high-grade, which can partly be explained by the greater data availability of advanced economies ( Table A1 in the appendix), which tend to have higher ratings. In our dataset, ten of these countries have never received a rating below AA, while only two industrialized countries (Greece and Israel) have never achieved a rating above A+; see Table A2 in the appendix. Transition and developing countries, however, tend to have much lower ratings. Among that group, only Slovenia achieved a high grade rating until they were downgraded during the European debt crisis in January 2012. Yet, the distribution features no bimodality that would suggest that countries below a certain rating face consecutive downgrades until they eventually default.
While this is at least some indication of convergence to a good equilibrium, ratings are characterized by enormous persistence. The share of observations with a rating change is a mere 3.5%. In our entire sample, we observe 187 upgrades and 133 downgrades (on average, slightly larger than upgrades). This low share of periods with rating changes is This degree of stickiness makes conducting an analysis in a traditional AR framework dicult, even if the variables of interest are technically stationary in the sense that they slowly return to a unique equilibrium (rather than an equilibrium curve as in a cointegration setting). Yet, ignoring the short-run dynamics would imply ignoring the shocks that drive ratings away from this long-run equilibrium, which is why it is crucial to use a model that combines short-and long-run eects.
Asymmetries: Even when considering the magnitude of rating changes in a single event, ratings move very slowly; see Figure 4 . If one or more agencies adjust their assessments, the average moves by at most one notch in more than 80% of downgrades and 95% of upgrades. Yet, another reading of those numbers is that rating movements of more than one step are four times more likely for downgrades than they are for upgrades.
That is, while we often observe a staggering of rating adjustments, with one or two agencies often moving rst and the third following the next month, downwards dynamics seem much more intense than the recovery. Such strong downgrades occur most often in advanced economies (where there is admittedly more room for downgrades, on average).
This impression is conrmed if we look at longer horizons. There, we can see that an initial downgrade may trigger several more in advanced economies, which amounts to a large total downgrade: the six largest cumulative rating downgrades over one year, between 4.5 and 9.5 notches, occurred in advanced economies. However, cumulative rating improvements are more or less equally distributed over advanced, transition and developing economies.
Asymmetry is not limited to the magnitude of a change, but more importantly, to the dynamics of change. Figure 5 month of the rating change) at longer horizons of 12 months before and after a rating change. While this does not provide conclusive evidence, the gure roughly identies two stories. During periods of downgrades, ratings changes, more often than not, seem to occur jointly with a peak in the interest rate. That is, the data conrm the nding of El-Shagi (2010) on a much broader level that rating downgrades occur late in an adjustment process, immediately before yields decrease again. Yet, during times of upgrades, rating changes are adjustments during an ongoing decline in risk premia.
While the general nding of asymmetry is shared by most of the rich literature on event studies of rating changes, many of those studies imply much stronger interest rate dynamics. However, most of those studies (e.g., Ferri et al. (1999) , Ki, Nowak & Schumacher (2012) , Afonso et al. (2012) ) are limited by the fact that they use comparably short windows of approximately 14 days before and after a rating announcement. While the short-run uctuations they analyze may be highly relevant for speculation purposes, they seem negligible given a longer perspective.
Event studies usually nd strong eects of rating announcements on yields on the days before and after the event. It is sometimes argued that this is a sign of an anticipation eect (Hill & Fa 2010) . However, the argument that ratings are sticky (Mora 2006) or lagging (Reisen & von Maltzan 1999 , El-Shagi 2010) seems more convincing. That is, we should expect Granger causality in both directions in general rather than only for short windows around events.
Model and estimation technique
In this section, we present the econometric model we use to answer the questions regarding As indicated by previous results and stylized facts, our model needs to account for the several features. In subsection 3.1, we explain how we perform a simultaneous estimation of the short-and long-run relations and how we perform the identication of (possibly many) long-run equilibria in principle. Subsection 3.1 presents the specic model. In subsection 3.3, we explain how we incorporate nonlinearity in rating levels into the model while ensuring a certain degree of smoothness. Subsection 3.4 explains the bootstrap procedure needed to account for the time and cross-sectional heterogeneity of shocks, while subsection 3.5 describes how we adapt the identication of long-run equilibria (and testing for multiple equilibria) due to the existence of asymmetric short-run eects.
3.1
The model structure The estimator only provides a single long-run relationship identied through the ratio of β 1 and β 2 . However, we would like to estimate the long-run relationship implied by changes in ratings and yields separately, thereby identifying the equilibrium yield as a function of the current rating and the equilibrium rating as function of the current yield.
Thus, we require some assumptions to allow for this kind of semistructural identication.
To achieve identication, we borrow from the literature on structural VAR and impose restrictions on the contemporaneous eects.
12
We assume that ratings have a contemporaneous eect on yields, but not vice versa. This assumption is reasonable for two reasons. First, ratings are characterized by high persistence at monthly frequencies. Second, and more importantly, we measure ratings on the rst day of the month and average yields over the month. That is, contemporaneous yields contain the information of up to a full month after the measurement of ratings.
The identication of the contemporaneous eect of ratings on yields is achieved by including the contemporaneous rating change in the yield equation (following Pesaran et al.
quite closely). This provides identication equivalent to the standard SVAR, which uses Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix. However, our approach comes at a considerable advantage. The ordered probit model used to explain (discrete) rating changes does not provide residuals. Therefore, a Cholesky decomposition could only be achieved by simultaneous estimation of the complete system of both equations and the covariance matrix. Our identication strategy, on the contrary, orthogonalizes residuals and thus (following the seminal argument by Sims (1980) ) allows for block-wise estimation.
Through the approach outlined above, rather than estimating the long-run relation, we estimate the long-run relation implied by each of the change variables (i.e., the rst difference of interest rates and the presence of up-or downgrades). Finding two individually signicant yet dierent long-run relations in both equations implies that while having enough persistence to dierentiate between long-and short-run eects the variables are 12 In the original framework of Pesaran et al., the contemporaneous correlation is captured through η 0 , i.e., the contemporaneous rst dierence of y without making any assumption as to whether this actually reects an impact of y on x or vice versa. To identify a unique long-run relationship, this is not consequential. Equation 1 can easily be solved for ∆y t as dependent variable without changing the relation of the coecients of the level variables β 1 and β 2 . not technically cointegrated in the traditional sense. Rather, they are either stationary or exhibit some type of regime-switching behavior.
Consider the exemplary long-run relations featured in Figure 6 (a) and (b) . Only in the rst case (a), where both long-run relations are the same, is there an innite number of equilibria in the sense that none of the points on the curve features a model intrinsic tendency for deviation (or no equilibrium in the sense that no single point acts as a permanent center of gravity). That is, a shock can potentially have permanent impact, as in a nonstationary system. If the lines intersect once as in case (b), only this combination of yields and ratings is stable over the long run, and both yields and ratings will move toward that combination over the very long run. That is, despite high persistence, as indicated by the very existence of a long-run relationship, the system is essentially stationary. Because our model should accommodate both the traditional cointegration case (a) and the more complex case (b), it is essential that the model remains well identied regardless of whether there is stationarity.
In order to allow our model to identity the frequently feared situation of a good and a default equilibrium (see Figure 6 (c)), we need to allow for nonlinearities in the long-run relations. To this end, rather than including the rating as a continuous variable, we use a semiparametric approach to estimate a functional form over a set of rating dummies.
3.2
The model
The yields model: Our interest rate equation takes the form:
where i is the interest rate, ∆r ∈ {−1, 0, 1} the change of the rating, r c a rating dummy, t the time index, and ε t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) an error term. We use up to p i lags and the contemporaneous rating changes. The possibly asymmetric eect of past changes is captured by the dierent coecients on positive (α l,p , γ l,p ) and negative (α l,n , γ l,n ) rating and yield changes. The rating dummies are dened such that r c indicates that the rating is lower than or equal to c. That is, for a rating of A, the rst 13 dummies (7-19) would be set to 1. For estimation purposes, we combine all default ratings (CCC-and below) in one reference class (captured in the constant) because very few ratings at or below Extremely Speculative (CCC) are observed. This leaves us with 18 dierent rating dummies. Dening the rating dummies cumulatively (i.e., a dummy equals 1 not only for countries with the respective rating but also for countries with better ratings) simplies the assessment of whether the dierence in eects between adjacent rating classes is statistically meaningful.
The modeling of rating levels with dummies introduces a potentially strong degree of nonlinearity. Thus, we are also able to detect possible structural breaks, which could for example exist at or around the investment grade threshold (a rating of B or below). In particular, our model allows to identify long run relationships as depicted in Figure 6 (c) ,
where the behavior of the system can become explosive beyond a certain threshold and the country is driven automatically into default.
While rating dummies refer to the average rating class of the three rating agencies, rating changes ∆r capture every rating change (both smaller and larger than one notch). We do this because the rating decision of a single agency may have a short-run eect on yields even if the average rating class does not change.
The asymmetric eects of negative and positive changes of both ratings and yields is an extension of the model in El-Shagi & von Schweinitz (2015) . We test models with asymmetric eects against its symmetric counterpart at dierent numbers of lags and nd, that the symmetric model is always signicantly outperformed by the asymmetric one.
The rating model: Exploiting the categorical nature of the ratings, we estimate an ordered probit model for the change of the rating, again allowing for asymmetries:
rating downgrade if: r * t < µ 1 , rating upgrade if: r * t > µ 2 where r * is the latent variable that is linearly dependent on the explanatory variables, and η t ∼ N (0, 1) is again an error term. We include p r + 1 lags of yields to remain consistent with the framework of Pesaran et al. (2001) (which uses an additional lag of the exogenous variable) while adhering to our identication strategy.
Specication: Lags are selected in each equation separately by the Bayesian information criterion with a maximum of six lags. We adjust the dataset to estimate both equations with exactly the same observations.
Inclusion of xed eects: Fixed eects are usually avoided in ordinal models because they are no longer identied when a cross-sectional unit is constantly in one of the extreme groups. While this is true for the level of the rating (with several advanced economies always being rated AAA), this does not occur when using rating changes as the dependent variable (because no country is permanently down-or upgraded). Thus, xed eects for N countries could be easily included in the form of N − 1 dummies in both equations. 13
In our view, the inclusion of country xed eects has both advantages and disadvantages. First, they account for possible dierences between countries that may aect yields and ratings. Thus, we could implicitly capture eects on our two variables originating from 13 Incidental parameters are sometimes a problem in ordered-choice models with panel data. However, this is of no concern as we have a large T dimension and relatively few countries N . other sources. However, many rating classes are only observed in a small number of countries, and (conversely) only few countries experience a large range of ratings. Therefore, xed eects could also blur the relation between yields and ratings by capturing the eects of individual rating classes instead of the eects for individual countries. As an econometric distinction between these two very dierent channels is hardly possible, we present the results without xed eects as a baseline and use xed eects estimation as a robustness check.
3.3
Exploiting the ordinal nature of ratings to model nonlinearity
The semiparametric estimation: When estimating equations (2) and (3) ratings. Essentially, despite modeling ratings through class dummies, we would like to obtain a well-behaved smooth function over rating classes, unless there is strong evidence (as in many data points) suggesting otherwise.
To achieve this objective, we borrow from an approach suggested by Breitung & Roling (2015) for mixed frequency data sampling (MIDAS). In MIDAS approaches, lowfrequency data (e.g., monthly ination) are explained through high-frequency data (e.g., daily oil price movements). Merely estimating many coecients for the high-frequency lags usually yields substantial identication problems. The existing literature has addressed this problem by restricting the coecients on high-frequency lags to follow a specic functional form that can be described by few parameters. However, Breitung & Roling (2015) argues that this might be overly restrictive and suggests a more exible nonparametric approach. Instead of enforcing a specic functional form, Breitung & Roling augments an objective function (such as the likelihood function) by a term that penalizes second dierences between coecients for lags of adjacent periods.
We employ the same strategy to enforce smooth behavior of the impact of ratings. Because our ratings dummies are dened cumulatively, we restrict not second but rst dierences between coecient estimates. This is equivalent to minimizing second dierences between mutually exclusive rating dummies, where the dummy equals 1 if and only if a country has the corresponding rating.
That is, instead of using the traditional likelihood function for our models (denoted by LL model ), we augment the likelihood function as follows:
where, depending on the model, ζ can be either β or ψ, and φ(ζ, 0, σ 2 model ) is the density of a normal distribution with mean zero and variance drawn from the errors in the respective model (σ 2 ε or σ 2 η ), measured at point ζ. By increasing the weight λ of the penalty LL smooth , it is possible to enforce the smooth behavior of adjacent coecients. 14 In the limit, when the penalty weight goes to innity, the coecients are forced to be identical, i.e., we would only estimate a single coecient.
If the weight of the penalty goes to zero, the results approach those of the unrestricted model, i.e., we would estimate 18 coecients. Breitung & Roling accordingly shows that λ can generally be mapped onto the eective loss of degrees of freedom. That is, we can use standard information criteria to select the degree of smoothing. On the one hand, if high dierences between the ratings are actually needed to explain the behavior of interest rates or ratings, we will choose a low degree of smoothing in the respective equation. On the other hand, if volatility in those coecients is merely driven by very few observations in specic classes, we will opt for smoothness.
In contrast to El-Shagi & von Schweinitz (2015) , we estimate a single λ for both equations.
This allows a more clear-cut comparison of the model, where the long-run relation is restricted to be identical in both equations, which implicitly includes a single rather than individual λs. That is, in our setup, a rejection of a single long-run relationship cannot be attributed to the inuence of using dierent λs.
Addressing heteroscedasticity
As mentioned in subsection 2.1, government bond yields are aected by more than one risk channel. Especially during times of turmoil in nancial markets, market participants may shift their portfolios toward government bonds that they deem safe (Vayanos 2004 , Beber, Brandt & Kavajecz 2009 ). This safe-haven eect (which is essentially herding behavior) may lead to self-fullling crises in other countries when creditors with a risk that is slightly worse than safe (but far from being in default) are shunned by nancial markets (De Grauwe & Ji 2013) . Herding behavior also reinforces a tendency to treat supercially comparable countries similarly without performing in-depth analyses of the individual debtors. This, in turn, may lead to spillovers of risk from one country to the next (Beirne & Fratzscher 2013) , that is, shocks to yields may be correlated across countries.
Shocks to the interest rate especially deviate from the usual i.i.d assumptions in our estimation. Indeed, we nd substantial heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation and heavy tails (as could, for example, be inferred from the results of Arezki et al. (2011) ).
We use a bootstrap method to account for heteroscedasticity (both over time and across countries) and cross-sectional correlation. It is based on the wild bootstrap originally proposed by Wu (1986) . In the wild bootstrap, rather than resampling the original residuals, the simulations are generated using error terms that are obtained by multiplying the original residual ε for the respective observation with a random multiplier v. The distribution of v ensures that the expected value of εv is 0 and that the rst few moments of the distribution of ε and εv are identical or at least very similar. In this paper, the random multiplier v is drawn from a 6-point distribution proposed by Webb (2013) , which has been shown to have even more desirable properties than the traditionally used distributions suggested by Mammen (1993) and Davidson & Flachaire (2008) . To reproduce the cross-country correlations found in the original sample, we use the same multiplier for all countries at a given point in time, i.e., v i,t = v j,t for all pairs of i and j. This follows an approach suggested by Davidson & MacKinnon (2010) , who used the same technique to reproduce the correlations among the residuals of several equations.
For the lack of a better alternative, the probit equation is simulated using i.i.d. errors 14 The likelihood contains √ λ, as equation (2) can be estimated by simple OLS with a quadratic penalty term (Breitung & Roling 2015) . drawn from a standard normal distribution. The starting values for the ratings and yields as well as the lagged dierences are drawn from the empirical joint distribution. Because we need low ratings in the simulated sample to have identication of all coecients, we combine the bootstrap with an acceptance-rejection algorithm that discards simulations where extremely low ratings which are also empirically unlikely do not occur. The reported condence bounds are based on 1,000 accepted simulations of the entire two equation system. Tests with 5,000 simulations showed virtually no dierence.
3.5
Assessing Testing for the number of long-run relationships: To assess whether the model allowing for individual long-run relationships in both equations outperforms the more traditional cointegration approach with identical long-run relationships in both equations, we use a standard likelihood ratio test. First, we estimate a restricted cointegration model where the long-run coecients in both equations are equal (β = ψ). Second, we compare the restricted and the unrestricted models using model-specic optimal smoothing parameters λ. Third, to guarantee comparability, the likelihood ratio test is performed twice more for pairwise identical λ. That is, we compare both models using the optimum λ selected for the cointegration model, and we compare both models using the λ selected Note: In addition to median long-run relationship, we show the 10%-and 90% condence bands from the bootstrap.
Results

The long-run relation of ratings and yields
Our preferred model allowing for dierent long-run relations in both equations strongly outperforms the basic cointegration approach. There is further evidence for the superiority of our benchmark model. Figure 7 plots the long-run relationships implied by our two equations, including their condence bounds. It is evident that the long-run relations are not merely dierent for most rating levels, they are economically and statistically signicantly dierent.
As theory predicts, both curves are signicantly negatively sloped, implying that (a) ratings tend to deteriorate if the interest rate is high (dashed line, from equation (3)) and that (b) the risk premium (measured through the interest rate) increases for countries with low ratings (solid line, from equation (2)). However, as indicated by the stylized facts presented in Section 2, we only nd a risk premium of noteworthy magnitude at extremely low ratings. Only far below the investment grade threshold of B or below does the equilibrium interest rate, as indicated by equation (2), start to increase, quickly reaching extreme heights.
This interest rate behavior is one of the main reasons why our point estimates indicate a single intersection of the long-run relations, which occurs at the highest ratings and at very low interest rates. When the rating is below AA-, the interest rate implied by the current rating is so low that it implies pressure for a rating upgrade. This is particularly true for low ratings, which are thus highly transitory.
The condence bands of the rating equation grow extremely wide for low ratings. Yet, the impression of a possible second equilibrium is partly driven by the reporting of independent condence bounds for both equations. When assessing the existence of a second equilibrium for each bootstrapped set of long-run relationships individually, we see that we can still signicantly reject the existence of a bad equilibrium. The high signicance of rejection in the presence of only a limited number of rating changes and correspondingly wide condence bands gives further credence to our results. For 98% of the bootstrapped sets of long-run relations, we nd that the equilibrium interest rate (according to the yield curve) creates upward pressure in the rating equation at all ratings below A-. Even in the unlikely case that a second equilibrium exists, that second equilibrium is unstable in the sense that there is no process driving the rating toward it.
Essentially, a second intersection of the rating and yield curves below a rating of CCC would not imply that a country can be driven into default by a vicious cycle of ratings and yields. This merely indicates that a country requires a positive impulse to escape default ratings. Because negative rating shocks are impossible at a D rating, a positive shock initiating recovery would be inevitable.
As a robustness test, we also estimate the model that includes country-specic eects.
Because this implies dierent intercepts in the long-run relationships, each country now has a separate equilibrium. For all countries except Pakistan, this equilibrium corresponds to a yield of less than 7 percent, and just as in the baseline estimation, there is no evidence of a second intersection for any country. Regarding the dynamics, as outlined in the following subsection, the results are even more similar; thus, they are not discussed separately. For the same reason, we refrain from presenting results on a robustness check where the average rating of the three rating agencies is replaced by its median.
Short-run dynamics and impulse response functions
Like the analysis of the long-term relationship, which found no gravitational pull toward default, the short-run dynamics do not provide evidence of a vicious cycle. While there is some autocorrelation in changes of ratings (especially for downgrades), it is far too little to imply the economically meaningful self-reinforcement of a negative shock. Only when the initial ratings are very close to default, the interest rate volatility generated by a negative rating causes an economically meaningful increase in the probability of further downgrades. Yet, this does not completely eliminate the role of rating shocks in creating macroeconomic distress. If a rating downgrade drives the rating below B, the impact is considerable. Due to the steep increase of the risk premium below this rating level, the interest rate quickly rises to extreme levels and remains high over an extended period due to the high persistence of ratings.
To illustrate this problem, we provide impulse response functions (IRF) based on the bootstrapped coecients after a relatively large rating shock, a downgrade of 2 notches.
The standard method of calculating an IRF is to simulate the reaction after a shock leading away from equilibrium. In our context, however, this is inadequate. Recovery from default ratings to the long-run equilibrium takes more than eighty years in the median (see Table 3 ). Because the nonlinearity in the risk premium causes shocks to have markedly dierent eects based on the original rating, it is essential to consider shocks to countries with dierent risk assessments. Thus, rather than reporting a single Note: Impulse response functions are signicant at the 5% level for approximately 60 periods for all rating shocks occurring from an initial rating of BB-or below. For higher ratings, the entire IRF becomes insignicant.
impulse response function starting at the long-run equilibrium, we report a range of IRFs for a negative 2-notch rating shock. Each IRF uses a dierent original rating level and the corresponding yield as given by the equilibrium yield curve. We report the dierence to the recovery path without the initial rating shock. The resulting IRFs of yields are presented in Figure 8 , while the IRFs of ratings are given in Figure 9 . Note: The number of years until a rating is reached for the rst time is calculated as the median of 5,000 simulations beginning from a rating of 6 and a yield of 60% (as indicated by the yield equation). This estimation thus includes the (in this case benecial) positive autocorrelation of rating changes. While the table includes all ratings, only the movement back to a level of AA is a recovery in the sense of a return to equilibrium. Further improvement in ratings is driven purely by chance, which explains the apparent break in the recovery times.
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The impact of the rating shock on the interest rate is only signicant if the rating shock drives the rating below a rating of B; see Figure A1 . That is, only when the rating of a country is already (far) below the investment grade threshold, further downgrades have a signicant increasing eect on yields. Yet, as soon as this happens, the eects are considerable. A rating shock driving the rating from B+ to B-causes a signicant increase in the interest rate for more than six years, peaking at approximately 3% after one year. The impact of a shock driving the rating from B-to CCC remains signicant for more than a decade, peaking at more than 12% after two years. For nearly ve years, the interest rate is increased by 5% or more compared to the benchmark recovery path.
The duration of the interest premium suggests that there will be a substantial increase in the interest burden, even given moderate debt rollover during this time. For countries with a low average maturity which might be the most likely to be hit by this type of shock (Arellano & Ramanarayanan 2012) the cost is even higher. This will strain the government budget, thereby limiting public good provision substantially. At the same time, the sovereign ceiling function of the sovereign rating will cause similar rating changes in the private sector, most likely corresponding to similar interest premia, which hamper investment. Given the high path dependence of economic development, the consequences of such periods might be noticeable long after the interest rate has normalized.
Concerning the dynamics of ratings, our results are mixed. On the one hand, the already discussed persistence of ratings makes it nearly impossible to catch up to the equilibrium recovery path after a substantial shock. Even after eight years, ratings remain signicantly below the original undisturbed recovery path for all starting ratings. This is partly 17 While impulse response functions are usually computed deterministically, i.e., without further shocks, this is unfeasible in our case due to the (ordered probit) rating equation. At each point in time, the most likely outcome is no rating adjustment. Yet, over time, the cumulative probability of a rating adjustment is increasing. Thus, the impulse responses are computed as the median of a range of simulations where both ratings and yields are subject to disturbances. By taking the median over many observations, we remove the idiosyncratic eect of shocks. Rather than computing the dierence between the median development with the initial rating shock and the median development without said shock, we always conduct the simulations with and without the 2-notch shock with identical simulated disturbances. For each pair, we compute the dierence individually and then report the median of those dierences. For the computation of condence bounds, which should include parameter uncertainty but not the idiosyncrasies of further disturbances, we repeat the aforementioned procedure for every bootstrapped set of coecients. That is, our condence bounds are quantiles of those median IRFs for dierent possible coecients. Note: Impulse response functions are signicant at the 5% level for approximately 40 periods for the lowest initial rating. For higher starting ratings, more periods are signicant, and from BBB+ onwards, ratings remain signicantly below the benchmark for the entire simulated period.
due to the eect of past yield changes on rating changes. Both increasing and decreasing yields make rating downgrades more likely; see table A3 in the appendix. This seemingly contradictory result may be explained by the inability of rating agencies to dierentiate between fundamentally justied yield movements and increased market volatility. As the second is a sign of nancial distress, which may by itself negatively aect the sustainability of government debt, the probability of a downgrade increases (slightly). However, ratings do not deteriorate further after an initial shock. Thus, we nd no evidence of self-reinforcing rating dynamics.
The response to a corresponding upgrade is fairly similar (although in the opposite direction), as shown in Figure A2 . While the dynamics are slightly dierent due to the strongly asymmetric impact of interest rate changes on ratings, the order of magnitude and the shape are comparable.
As a robustness test of the results provided above, we test an alternative downgrade scenario, wherein we distribute the two-notch shock of the previous scenario over two consecutive months. As our rating equation employs two lags, this scenario tests the potential self-reinforcing behavior of downgrades. Without taking yield changes and level eects into account, two successive downgrades would increase the probability of a third downgrade from 1% to 44%. Therefore, these results should be interpreted as a worst-case response to a large rating shock. Both IRFs (yields and ratings) show larger dierences to the benchmark adjustment cases, as shown in Figure A3 . We can conrm that even transitory default after a negative rating shock is highly unlikely if the initial rating is not already close to default. Even for a starting rating of B, the probability of a default (as a transitory state) is only 2%, and it is almost zero for better ratings.
Scenario analysis
To provide more conclusive evidence for the claim that the downward spirals of countries such as Greece were not caused by their initial rating downgrade, this section presents scenario analyses in which the impulse response developments are initialized with data from some episodes of major nancial distress and compared to the observed development.
The scenarios (i.e., the shock and the subsequent development) are depicted in Figures 10 and 11 along with the impulse response functions and the two sets of condence bands. In addition to the condence bounds reported for the IRFs, which only include parameter uncertainty, we provide condence bounds including uncertainty concerning future shocks (not unlike the condence bounds used in forecasting). This gives a more reasonable benchmark to assess the probability of an observed development, which does, of course, include an entire sequence of disturbances rather than merely the initial event.
We report the results for two events: the downgrade of Italy after the EMS crisis in the early 1990s and the rst sequence of downgrades of Greece during the ongoing debt crisis.
Italy in 1992: First, we examine Italy. As one of the founding members of the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM), Italy enjoyed a AAA rating until July 1991 when Moody's rst downgraded it by one notch to AA+ (Aa1 in Moody's notation),
making Italy the only G7 country with a rating below AAA at that time. A second downgrade, this time by two notches to AA-, followed on August 13, 1992. The reasons for these downgrades were the exceptionally high debt levels that the Italian government had amassed in previous years (exceeding 100% of GDP in 1992) together with large external imbalances. Harsh austerity measures, privatization and laws aimed at reducing However, the rating agency held that these measures had come too late. Therefore, the agency predicted that government debt would grow further during the 1990s (as it in fact did). Another fact that was thought to aggravate debt problems was the overvalued Italian currency, which was restricted by the rules of the ERM. Again, the rating agencies' assessment was largely sound. Italy left the ERM one month later in September 1992 and devalued strongly (see also El-Shagi, Lindner & von Schweinitz forthcoming).
It seems that the decision to downgrade the rating was largely a consequence of previous developments. Judging the reforms as coming too late, Moody's itself acknowledged that there had been enough to announce an earlier downgrade. Similarly, the European community had previously voiced its concerns, citing the Maastricht criteria (among them, a maximum government debt level of 60% of GDP) that were introduced in February 1992. Even the Italian minister of the treasury was not excessively concerned by the downgrade. Therefore, it is not surprising that the reaction of the markets was normal; see Figure 10 . The observed development of yields is quite close to the development of the simulated IRF, with all dierences (except for the rst month) being within the wider set of condence bands. The observed ratings are identical to the simulated series for most of the time. Overall, this is a typical case in which the discrete rating change reected an assessment of the sustainability of government debt that was shared by the markets, which holds for the large majority of rating changes. . Taken together, it should be clear that not ratings but political developments likely fueled the collapse toward default in 2012. That is, this development cannot be attributed to the initial (weak) downgrades of the rating agencies.
Greece in 2010:
Conclusion
In conclusion, our evidence reconciles the two prominent conicting views featured in the existing literature, which partly stresses the dangers of low ratings and partly denies the importance of ratings.
On the one hand, we nd rather strong evidence against the theory of a vicious cycle. This is true for both the strong form of this theory that speculates the existence of a second bad equilibrium that might emerge after a rating is driven below moderate risk levels and the weaker form of the theory that focuses on self reinforcing short-run dynamics. Neither cycle is found in our data, at least not at a meaningful level. The usual interaction between ratings and yields fails to explain the downward spirals observed in a few cases. The vicious cycle theory seems driven by misinterpreting a few individual observations as typical.
On the other hand, there can be substantial costs to rating downgrades. If a rating shock drives a country below a B rating, the risk premium can virtually explode. While the impact of ratings is negligible for better ratings, the increase is considerable for countries that begin at problematic levels before the downgrade and can easily reach a 2-digit magnitude. Due to the persistence of ratings, it is more than likely that the country will pay this cost for an extended period. Note: lyields is the coecient of lagged yields; facratings the dummy for ratings that are at most as good as this level; dyields and dratings denote lagged dierences, with the asymmetric separation captured by the subindices p and n; -1|0 and 0|1 are the thresholds of the ordered probit ratings model, the equivalent to the constant in the yields model. The smoothing coecient λ is restricted to be equal in both equations. * * * , * * , * denote signicance of a one sided test at the 1%, 5% and 10%-condence levels. Figure A3 : Selected impulse-response functions after a staggered rating shock.
